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2Abstract
In the problem of optimal taxation in an economy with labor and capital, the
optimal solution when the government can commit to a sequence of tax rates entails
the tax on capital to tend to zero in the limit, with all the tax burden on labor. It is
well known, however, that this solution is time inconsistent; so if the commitment
power is not perfect, this second best tax plan will not be sustainable.
We model explicitly the trade-o¤ between the cost of revising the tax plan, and
the bene…t of the revision. As a result, when commitment is not possible, both
the limit tax rate and the steady state capital are di¤erent from their levels in the
second best solution. Limit taxeson capital may be strictly positive; but it may also
be the case that the only sustainable plan has subsidies to capital. The subsidies
induce an overaccumulation of capital, which becomesa commitment device against
revisions of the tax plan. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation numbers:
H21, C73.
Key Words: Optimal Taxes, Commitment, Incentive Compatibility.
31 Introduction
In a competitive economy where capital and labor are used to produce output,
a benevolent government chooses a sequence of tax rates on these two factors,
trying to maximize the lifetime utility of a representative agent. In doing so it is
facing, in the standard models in the literature (see for instance [8], [1], or [2]),
two constraints. First it has to collect in each period a …xed, exogenously given,
amount. It may use to this purpose the revenue frombondstosmooth the collection
of revenue over time: but the overall payments have to be …nanced through tax
collection. Second, since the economy is competitive, it has to anticipate that
the public will adjust their choices to the chosen tax plan, by optimizing their
consumption plans taking prices and taxes as given. Since the taxes will change
the marginal returns on the factors, taxes will have a distortive e¤ect, which will
induce, over and above the loss of income, an e¢ciency loss. The plan chosen
under these two constraints is called the second best tax plan. This is the dynamic
version of the general problem of optimal taxation in a competitive economy: for
a review see Mirlees [16].
The problem in the setup we have just described has been studied at length,
both from the theoretical and empirical point of view.1 In particular one result
stands out for its simplicity, sharpness, and robustness: in the limit, the optimal
tax rate on capital income is zero, and all the tax burden is on labor. We will
refer to this as the Chamley-Judd result (see the papers by these two authors
quoted above). In fact the sequence of tax rates has a bang-bang feature: capital
is typically taxed maximally in the …rst periods, and then taxes are shifted on
labor. So in the …rst phase, when the capital stock is a given quantity, distortion
is minimized by taxing the stock factor (capital); in the second phase, where the
distortive e¤ects on capital would be great, taxesprovide incentive toaccumulation,
and shift entirely on labor.
It is also well known, however, that the second best tax plan is time incon-
sistent: the government will have incentive to change the announced plan, in the
interest of the representative agent himself, at later periods.2 The reason for this
inconstistency is clear: in the early periods it is optimal to announce low tax rates
on capital in the future, in order to promote accumulation. When the future be-
comes present, however, and capital has been accumulated, it becomes convenient
to do the opposite and tax capital (with no distortive e¤ect) rather than to impose
distortionary taxes on labor. So, unless the government has some commitment
power to bind itself to implement, at any future date, the plan it has announced
in the very …rst period, the plan will not be credible. Such a commitment power is
however hardly acceptable in this extreme form. In a more reasonable formulation,
the government is aware that a change in plans may have costs, for example from
1See for example [5] or [15]. Several recent papers ( [18], [6], [7] or[9]) treat the optimal
taxation problem in the context of endogenous growth.
2For an early discussion of time-inconsistency see Kydland and Prescott [12].
4the point of view of its own credibility. This considerations and these costs are
not, however, present in the models we have referred to above.
In this paper we take the point of view that the constraint of time consistency
should be taken into account, and explicitly modelled. (For some related work see
[3],[4], [14], [13], or [20]) This is accomplished by imposing a third constraint on
the choice of the government: the tax plan has to satisfy the additional restriction
that in any period the utility that the representative agent will have, from that[19]
point onwards, according to the announced plan, must be at least as large as the
utility he would derive if the government changes its plans, no matter how this
is done. We refer to this constraint as an incentive compatibility constraint, and
denote the tax plans that satisfy it as consistent plans. In particular, in some of
our formulations below, we take the extreme case in which after a deviation the
government has a complete loss of credibility: from that point on the public will
assume that it cannot commit to any policy which is not simply the period by
period maximization of output. This equilibrium following a revision of the tax
plan determines endogenously a deviation value, which may in particular depend
on the value of the capital and other assets at the moment of deviation.
Now consider again the problem of designing the optimal taxes, and focus
in particular on the steady state in the equilibrium with the optimal taxes. As
mentioned above, the Chamley-Judd result tells us that in the limit the tax rate
on capital income is zero. Therefore, the time inconsistency of the solution is most
extreme precisely at steady state, when the tax on capital is smallest and the
incentive to revise the plan in order to relieve the economy of distortionary labor
taxes, the largest. This seems to rule out the promise of any low tax on capital
in the far future, because it is a non-credible promise. But can the only optimal
solution be an increase in the tax rate on capital?
Further re‡ection will show this conclusion is not obviously true. An change
in the tax rate on capital may for instance reduce the accumulation rate and the
steady state level of capital; and this in turn might reduce the utility per period
to the representative agent at the steady state. Therefore in the choice of the
sustainable optimal tax rate in the far future, the planning government will have
to consider how the level of steady state capital will adjust to the di¤erent tax
plans, and how the value of the two di¤erent options, sticking to the announced
plan or modifying it, change as a consequence. Clearly a more detailed analysis is
necessary, and this will be found in this paper.
It may be a surprise then that the optimal tax policy may have capital subsidies
in the limit, as we show in sections 4.1, 4.2, and via calibrated examples in section
4.2.3 This is surprising because even if the public does not believe a promise of
a zero capital tax in the future, it may nevertheless …nd the promise of a future
capital subsidy credible: the reason for this is that, once implemented the steady
state capital stock would be higher, and this would reduce the incentive of the
government to deviate from its promise. In such a situation a positive incentive to
3Judd [10] discusses how subsidies to capital at a steady state can be optimal under comitment
if there are imperfectly competitive markets distorting th economy.
5accumulate induces a high level of capital; both the utility per period and the value
fromdeviating increase, but the …rst grows with capital more than the second, until
the plan becomes sustainable. The higher level of capital has created an endogenous
commitment device that makes the revision of the tax, conditional on that level of
capital, too costly compared to the value of continuing with the announced plan.
The economy has then reached a level of equilibrium in over-accumulation.
We may now proceed with a detailed presentation.
2 The Optimal Taxation Problem
In this section we will set up the problem to study the best sustainable taxes in
the presence of government bonds. The elements of the vector (ct;Lt;kt;bt;wt;rt)
represent respectively consumption, labor, capital, bonds, the wage rate net of
labor taxes and the return on assets net of taxes, all at time t.




t (u(ct) ¡ v(Lt)):
The government’s problem is to maximize the agent’s utility, but it must set
labor and capital tax rates so as to create enough revenue to …nance a stream of
expenditures equal to G in each period, which is exogenous and …xed. Taxes on la-
bor are the di¤erence between the marginal product labor and w; and capital taxes
are the di¤erence between the marginal product of capital and r:The production
function is f(k;L): We assume:
Assumption 1 The function u is concave, increasing, di¤erentiable; the function
v is convex, increasing and di¤erentiable; ¯ 2 (0;1). The function f is concave,
homogeneous of degree one.
The government can buy or sell bonds to the public with rate of return r;
which is the same as the rate of return on capital. We impose no constraints on
the quantity of government bonds, which can be positive or negative: in principle
the government can be a net debtor or creditor. However we restrict the net return
on capital in the initial period to be non-negative: r0 ¸ 0:4 Thisrestriction prevents
the government from taxing k0 at a high enough rate to induce the public to borrow
from it an amount su¢cient to …nance all future government expenditures from
interest payments alone. Such a scheme would avoid distortionary taxes, but would
also require a large amount of negative bonds and unacceptable levels of taxation
of the inelastic initial capital. It is standard in the optimal taxation literature to
rule out such a solution to the problem by bounding from below either r0 , or b0
and b.
4Of course zero is chosen for simplicity. Another lower bound may also do.
6The problem of the government therefore is to set tax rates for the future to
maximize the utility of the representative agent, subject to generating su¢cient
revenue to cover its expenditures. The problem can be formulated in the man-
ner of Chamley or Judd, where the government chooses the sequence of vectors
f(ct;Lt;kt;bt;wt;rt)tg to satisfy the …rst order conditions of the agent, provided
these are su¢cient to yield the agent’s optimum, and to meet its own revenue con-
straints. As we discussed in the introduction, the solution of this problem is time
inconstistent.
2.1 The Optimal Consistent Taxation
We therefore formulate the problem di¤erently. We investigate the best taxes that
the government can announce for the future, subject to the constraint that it will
not want to deviate from its announcement. Here “best” is again used in the sense
of maximizing the utility of the agent, subject to generating su¢cient revenue to
cover expenditures G.
To de…ne this problem we must specify what the consequences of deviating
from announced taxes will be. For example, one consequence can be the loss of
reputation for the government, which leads the public to expect maximal capital
taxes in every period in the future, with the result that savings are reduced. In
each period then the government must compare the bene…ts of deviating, which
allows the government to impose lower distortionary labor taxes in that period,
with the costs of deviating that comes from lower future savings rates and lower
discounted utility for the agents. Therefore we impose on government’s problem
an incentive-compatibility constraint: at each future period, continuing with the
announced tax policy must yield to the agent a discounted utility that is at least as
high as the discounted utility that the agent will obtain if the government deviates
in any way from its announced policy.
We will start by specifying a general functional form for the value of deviation
that depends on the values of bonds and capital at the beginning of the period. A
speci…c example, where in response to a deviation by the government the agents
expect maximal taxes on capital in future periods and therefore stop investing, will
be analyzed in section 4.2 below.
To summarize, the constraints imposed on the government by the …rst order
conditions of the agent are given, for each t = 1;2:::; by:
wtu
0(ct) ¡ v
0(Lt) = 0 (2.1)
u
0(ct) ¡ ¯rt+1u
0(ct+1) = 0: (2.2)
The budget constraint of the agent is given by :
¡kt+1 ¡ bt+1 + rt(kt + bt) + wtLt = ct (2.3)
and the economy-wide feasibility constraint given by:
7kt+1 + ct + G ¡ f(kt;Lt) = 0: (2.4)
The additional equations expressing the government budget constraint are au-
tomatically satis…ed if the previous equations are satis…ed; so we ignore them.
Let the value of deviation at time t be given by V D(kt;bt): we assume that this
function is di¤erentiable in both variables. The incentive compatibility constraints




t¡i (u(ct) ¡ v(Lt)) ¸ V
D(ki;bi) (2.5)
for every i = 0;1;::: The Lagrangian of the government’s problem is therefore:
P1
t=0 ¯
t[u(ct) ¡ v(Lt) + ¸t (u0(ct) ¡ ¯rt+1u0(ct+1))
+¹t (wtu0(ct) ¡ v0(Lt)) + ´t (kt+1 + ct + G ¡ f(kt;Lt))








u(ct) ¡ v(Lt) ¡ V D(ki;bi)
´´
(2.6)
with respect to (ct;Lt;kt;bt;wt;rt)t, for a given pair k0;b0.
The vector f(¸t;¹t;´t;»t;·t)tg is the vector of multipliers associated with the
…rst order conditions for the optimization problem of the agent, the feasibility
constraints and budget constraints; the °0
i elements are the multipliers associated
with the incentive constraints.
The maximand in the problem (2.6) above is not concave, even when the in-
centive constraints are ignored. This lack of concavity is well-known to arise in
the standard formulations of the optimal taxation literature under commitment.
Therefore the characterization results that are obtained yield only necessary con-
ditions for optimality. For example, the well-known result due to Chamley and
Judd states that if an optimal solution converges to a steady state, then the capi-
tal taxes asymptotically go to zero: this result follows directly from the …rst order
conditions. Our analysis of the best sustainable tax program given below will also
primarily lead to results that are obtained from the necessary conditions.
We now turn to the …rst order conditions for the problem given by (2.6). The
conditions given below must hold at each t = 1;2::: The …rst order condition with
respect to kt for the government’s problem is:
¡´tfK(kt;Lt) + ¯






@k and V D
k (kt;bt) =
V D(kt;bt)
@k : This condition can also be
expressed as :
(»t + ´t)(rt ¡ fK(kt;Lt)) = °t¯
¡tV
D






The …rst order condition with respect to ct is:
u
00(ct)(¸t ¡ ¸t¡1rt + ¹twt) + u
0(ct) + ´t = ¡¯
¡t (° ¤ ¯)t u
0(ct) (2.8)
8where we de…ne (° ¤ ¯)t =
Pt
i=1°i¯
t¡i: The …rst order condition with respect to
bt;rt;wt;Lt respectively are:









0(ct) + »t(kt + bt) + ·t = 0; (2.10)
¹tu
0(ct) + »tLt = 0; (2.11)
(»t + ´t)(wt ¡ fL(kt;Lt))¡¹tv
00(Lt)¡(´t + u
0(ct))wt = ¯
¡t (° ¤ ¯)t v
0(Lt) (2.12)
and where fL(kt;Lt) =
@f(kt;Lt)
@L : The above equations, together with the initial
conditions and transversality conditions, de…ne the system to be studied. To ana-
lyze the properties of this system we …rst turn to the steady state.
3 The Steady State
We …rst note that when incentive constraints are ignored, the Chamley-Judd result
that the optimal capital taxes at a steady state are zero follows immediately from
the …rst order condition on capital. In fact in this case the equation 2.7 above
simpli…es to:






But at steady state the multipliers »t and ´t are constant (see the discussion after
the equation (5.56) in the appendix) hence the above equation implies r = fK,
which is the Chamley-Judd result.5. The remaining steady state equations are:
u
00(c)(¸t ¡ ¸t¡1r + ¹tw) + u
0(c) + ´t = ¡¯
¡t (° ¤ ¯)t u
0(c) (3.14)





0(c) + »t(k + b) + ·t = 0 (3.16)
¹tu
0(c) + »tL = 0 (3.17)
(»t + ´t)(w ¡ fL(k;L)) ¡ ¹tv
00(L) ¡ (´t + u
0(c))wt = ¯
¡t (° ¤ ¯)t v
0(L) (3.18)
5For an interesting analysis of the dynamics of redistributive taxation around a steady state
in a special case, see [11].
9wu
0(c) ¡ v
0(L) = 0 (3.19)
¯r = 1 (3.20)
k + c + G¡ f(k;L) = 0 (3.21)
(r ¡ 1)(k + b) + wL = c (3.22)
In addition, if the incentive constraint is binding we also have,
(1 ¡ ¯)
¡1(u(f(k;L) ¡ G¡ k) ¡ v(L)) ¡ V
D(k;b) = 0 (3.23)
In those cases in which the incentive constraint is not binding we have the Chamley-
Judd condition stated above:
¯
¡1 = fK(k;L) (3.24)
Now using equations (3.19), (3.21) and ( 3.22), we obtain:
f(k;L) ¡ G¡ k = (r ¡ 1)(k + b) + (u
0(f(k;L) ¡ G¡ k))
¡1v
0(L)L
which can be written, using equation (3.20) as:







0(f(k;L) + G¡ k))
¡1v
0(L)L (3.25)
This equation can be solved for (k;L); if b is given, either in conjunction with
(3.24) in the case without incentive constraints, or in conjunction with (3.23) when
incentive constraints are taken into account and are binding. In both cases it is
clear that all the steady state values will depend on b; and therefore indirectly
on both b0 and k0:6 To analyze this dependence explicitly, we must consider the
6The dependence of steady state values on initial conditions when government bonds are
present is well-known, and is discussed in Chamley [1]. The initial value of government bonds
make a di¤erence because the amount of revenue that the government needs to raise with dis-
tortionary taxes in order to …nance its expenditures depends on its future revenues, that is its
revenue steam resulting from its initial bond position. Note of course that for positive revenues
the goverment must be a net creditor, and must buy bonds initially, which is highly unrealistic.
Therefore a lower (non-positive) limit on initial government bonds, or an upper bound on the
…rst period tax rate, which ammounts to the same, are reasonable assumptions. As discussed in
Chamley [1] and [2] however, if there is a binding limit on the …rst period tax rate, the govern-
ment will not …nd it optimal to accumulate assets in susequent periods by buying bonds from the
public to the point of …nancing all its expenditures by interest collections. The reason is that the
taxes after the initial period are distortionary, and there is a trade-o¤ between distorting labor
and capital markets early on versus distorting them later on. As Chamley shows, generally labor
taxes will continue to be positive at the steady state even in an economy with bonds, provided
there is a binding limit on …rst period taxes.
10…rst-order conditions that apply to the initial period, and solve for the steady state
values in conjunction with them. In the appendix we show how we can solve for
the steady state values in this manner, given initial conditions (k0;b0). We de…ne:
De…nition 1 Let x(b) = (r(b);w(b);c(b);k(b);L(b)) be a solution of the equa-
tions (3.19), (3.20), (3.21), ( 3.22), and (3.23). We refer to x(b) as a candidate
incentive-constrained steady state.
As mentioned above, the steady state value of b must be determined in con-
junction with initial conditions (k0;b0); as shown in the appendix.
Equation (3.25) can be used to solve for L in terms of (b;k); and in an econ-
omy without bonds in terms of k alone. The solution for L however may not be
unique, as the special cases discussed in the following sections demonstrate. In
such situations it will be necessary to determine which of the solutions for L in
equation (3.25 ) is the optimizing one. This can be done by checking which of
the various solutions of L yields the highest steady state values, given by the …rst
term in equation (3.23). The solution of equation (3.23) itself however may have
multiple solutions in (k;b), representing the intersections of the value of defection
with the value of continuation along the optimal solution. Therefore the various
combinations of steady state values, evaluated at the appropriate L(k;b); have to
be compared in order to determine the optimal stationary solution. This will also
determine whether, at the optimal steady state satisfying the incentive constraints,
the returns to capital will be taxed or subsidized. The next section will illustrate
the various possibilities in special cases.
Determining the optimal steady state from among the possible steady state
solutions above can be achieved through direct comparisons. A more analytical
approach is to solve for the associated Lagrange multipliers and check whether
they satisfy the appropriate Kuhn-Tucker conditions. In particular, for our prob-
lem given above, the multipliers associated with the incentive compatibility con-
straints, that is the multipliers given by the sequence f°g1
i , must be positive and
summable7. In the proposition 1 below, we provide a condition to assure this.
De…ne:
1 + a ´
E ¡ F










































7More precisely they must be contained in the dual space of `1, which contains `1, the space
of summable sequences.
11M ´ (1 + ¾L)w ¡ fL(kt;Lt)





and M; are evaluated at steady state
values. The following proposition is proved in the appendix:
Proposition 1 Suppose that x(b) is a solution to the government’s problem (2.6)
from initial conditions (k(b);b); that is, it is a steady state solution for the problem
given by (2.6). Then 1 + a 2 (0;¯
¡1); where a is evaluated at x(b):
In the special cases discussed in the next section, we will check whether the
condition given by lemma (1) holds in order to rule out stationary solutions to
equation (3.23) that are not optimal stationary solutions for the problem given
above in (2.6)
4 Incentive Compatible Steady States
We have now all the elements needed to characterize the set of incentive compatible
steady states; in particular we will investigate whether capital will be taxed or
subsidized at the optimal incentive constrained steady states. For simplicity, we
will start by focussing on the case of an economy without bonds. We give a partial
characterization of steady states in lemma 1 and in the proposition 2. We obtain
a sharper characterization in Proposition 3 for the case of a linear utility function.
We then use the necessary conditions implied by the Lagrange multipliers, given
in lemma 1, to rule out some steady states and identify the optimal ones. These
results are in the two propositions 4 and 5. Finally, we provide a speci…c a family
of examples where the optimal solution to the government problem can have an
incentive constrained steady state solution at which capital is subsidized. Table
1 at the end of this section shows, in a parametrized and calibrated family of
examples, how capital taxes and subsidies can vary with the curvature of the
production function and the labor supply elasticity. Table 2 presentsanother family
of examples, with a strictly concave utility function, and identi…es the steady state
with a capital subsidy as the optimal one, for equilibrium trajectories originating
close to it. In the following we assume a stronger version of assumption 2:
Assumption 2 v(0) = 0 and limL!1 v0(L) = 1:
The procedure to determine the steady states is the following. Take any value
k of the capital stock, and consider it as a possible candidate to be a steady state
value. That is, consider the steady state equations (i.e. equations (4.29), (4.30)
and (4.31) below) at that value of k. The solution of these equations determines the
value of consumption and labor, and therefore of the utility of the representative
consumer, at that steady state; this determines a function W(k), which is the value
12per period to the representative consumer in an economy which maintains k as the
steady state value, at the competitive equilibrium where the tax on capital income
is zero, and enough tax revenue is generated to pay for G.
Now let V D(k) be the value of deviation at k. A necessary condition for k
to be an incentive compatible steady state value is that the total future utility,
W(k)
(1¡¯), is at least as large as V D(k). So the candidate optimal steady states for the
constrained problem are given by the intersection of the two curves described by
V D and W
(1¡¯).
The analysis of an economy with bonds will be a straightforward modi…cation
of the analysis of this section: the equation (4.30) that follows should be replaced,
in the analysis of the steady state of an economy with bonds, by the equation 8
k¯
¡1 + b(¯
¡1 ¡ 1) + wL = f(k;L) ¡ G (4.28)
The steady state values of (L;c;w), for a …xed steady state value of the capital
stock, are determined by the three equations:
k + c + G = f(k;L) (4.29)
k¯




This system of three equations determines the values of the three unknowns
(L;c;w); this solution however is generally not unique. Let us discuss the set of




u0(f(k;L) ¡ k ¡ G)
¡ f(k;L) + G ´ ©(k;L) = 0 (4.32)
Note that ©(k;0) = k¯
¡1 + G and limL!1 ©(k;L) = 1 for every k; so the
equation (4.32) has a (possibly empty) compact set of solutions. We denote by
L1(k) and L2(k) respectively the smallest and largest solution of (4.32). By their
de…nition:
©L(k;L1(k)) · 0 · ©L(k;L2(k)): (4.33)
Let now kg be the steady state value of the capital stock in the case of com-
mitment; as we know, this is the value determined in the system (4.29), ( 4.30),
(4.31) above, plus the condition of zero tax on capital. This steady state will be
a steady state of the problem without commitment if and only if
W(kg)
(1¡¯) ¸ V D(kg).
If not, the steady state of the constrained problem will be, if it exists, one of the
intersections of the two curves; let us denote it by k¤. (See Figure 1 where we use
V (k) ´
W(k)
(1¡¯); k¤ can be k1 or k2: )
8See a Section 5.1 in the appendix, and also footnote 3.
13k k 1 k 2 k g
V(k)
VD (k)
Figure 1: kg is time-inconsistent
Figure 1 illustrates that perturbations of parameters of the system may change
the intersections of V (k) and V D (k); without necessarily changing the qualitita-
tive nature of the results. For example, if the value of deviation were to be higher
because the trust of the public in the government to stick to its commitments
could more easily and quickly restored after a deviation, the value of deviation
would V D (k) would shift up. The two possible incentive compatible steady states
would move apart, the lower one requiring a higher capital tax rate while the higher
one requiring a higher capital subsidy. As long as the intersections of V (k) and
V D (k) are transversal, the two incentive compatible steady states which are dis-
tinct from the commitment steady state would be robust to perturbations. We
further explore how the incentive compatible steady states change with various
parameters in section 4.2 for some speci…c numerical examples (see Table 1 and 2).
Implicit di¤erentiation of equation (4.32) gives:
Lemma 1 In the region k ¸ kg, L2(k) · L2(kg); L2 is a decreasing function;
fK(k;L2(k)) · ¯
¡1; and fK(¢;L2(¢)) is decreasing.
Let us immediately note an implication of this:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the constrained capital stock k¤ is larger than kg:
then capital is subsidized at the steady state k¤.
Of course we have to show that a situation as described in the proposition 2
may in fact occur. This is done the next section. We begin with a simple case of
linear utilty, and further sharpen Proposition 2.
144.1 Linear Utility
In general the solution to the …rst order conditions for the problem of optimal time-
consistent taxes may not be unique, and in particular may yield more than one
equilibrium solution for the labor supply. Evaluating and comparing the multiple
solutions to analytically identify the optimal one may be quite intractable. For
this reason, we now restrict our attention to the case of utility functions linear in
consumption, where u(c) = c: In fact a major simpli…cation occurs in this case:
the choice of the equilibrium quantity of labor is the largest solution of the …rst
order conditions, both at steady state and at any point on the optimal path. The
examples in the subsequent section involving subsidies to capital however will be
constructed with linear as well as non-linear utility functions.
Take any pair (kt;Lt), and set (this is imposed by the linear utility and the …rst
order condition of the agent) rt = ¯
¡1; it is easy to see that there are still many
possible equilibrium quantities for labor. However, if we let f(kt;Lt;ct;rt;wt);t =
0;1;:::g be the optimal path, then for any t, Lt is the largest solution of the
equation in L given by:
kt¯
¡1 + v
0(L)L + G¡ f(kt;L) = 0 (4.34)
In fact, if we let for any t the choice of kt;kt+1;rt be given, the fact that the path
is optimal implies that the value Lt is a solution of:
max
L f(kt;L) ¡ v(L) ¡ G¡ kt+1
subj. to f(kt;L) ¡ v
0(L)L ¡ G¡ kt¯
¡1 = 0: (4.35)
Now take L1 · L2 be any two solutions of the above constraint given by equation
(4.35). The di¤erence in the utility given by the two choices is equal to v0(L2)L2¡
v(L2)¡v0(L1)L1+ v(L1): Our claim that Lt is the largest solution of the equation
4.34 follows from the fact that the function v0(L)L ¡ v(L) is strictly increasing.
Let L2(kt) denote the largest solution of (4.35). It now follows that at the
steady state the optimal choice of labor is L2(k) for any k. Also the lemma 1 has
a stronger version, as follows.
Lemma 2 The function L2 is increasing in the region k · kg, and decreasing in
the region k ¸ kg; the function fK(¢;L2(¢)) ¡ ¯
¡1 is decreasing everywhere.
The proof is straightforward, and based on the analysis of the system of di¤er-
ential equations giving L2 and fK ¡ ¯
¡1 as a function of k. Note that thanks to
this lemma the steady state taxes on capital income are completely characterized:
Proposition 3 If the steady state value k¤ is larger than kg , then capital is sub-
sidized; if on the contrary k¤ is smaller than kg, then capital is taxed.
15We can now turn to the analysis of the necessary condition (4.36). As we have
seen, a necessary condition for a steady state of the constrained problem, when the
incentive compatibility constraints are binding, is that the multipliers computed in
the previous section are positive and summable. In particular the condition that
1 + a 2 (0;¯
¡1) (4.36)
has to be satis…ed. The following Lemma relates this condition to the slopes of
V D (k) and W (k):
Lemma 3 1. If V D
k (k) ·
W 0(k)
1¡¯ , then 1+a 2 (0;¯
¡1) if and only if V D
k (k) · ¯
¡1:
2. If V D
k (k) ¸
W 0(k)
1¡¯ , then 1 + a 2 (0;¯
¡1) if and only if V D
k (k) ¸ ¯
¡1:
Proof. Recall that in the present case:









where ©L = ©L(k;L2(k)); so that 1 + a 2 (0;¯















to derive our conclusion in both cases.






then it cannot be the case that 1 + a 2 (0;¯
¡1) both at k1 and k2; i.e. it cannot be
that both are optimal steady states. (See Figure 1, where V (k) ´
W(k)
(1¡¯) )
Note in fact that V D
k (k2) ¸
W 0(k2)
1¡¯ and V D
k (k1) ·
W 0(k1)
1¡¯ . From the lemma 3,
if 1 + a 2 (0;¯
¡1) at k2 then V D
k (k2) ¸ ¯
¡1, and therefore V D
k (k1) > ¯
¡1. Now
lemma 3 again implies that 1+a 6 2(0;¯
¡1) at k1. The argument in the other case
is identical.
Lemma 4 1. If k¤ ¸ kg, and V D
k (k¤) ·
W 0(k¤)
1¡¯ , then 1 + a 2 (0;¯
¡1):
2. If k¤ · kg, and V D
k (k¤) ¸
W 0(k¤)
1¡¯ , then 1 + a 2 (0;¯
¡1):





and given the explicit form of
W 0(k¤)





But at L2(k) from lemma 3 we have that fK(k;L)¡¯
¡1 · 0, and ©L(k;L2(k) ¸
0. The proof of 2 is similar.
We conclude that:
Proposition 5 In the situation of proposition 4, if kg ¸ k2, then the only con-
strained steady state which satis…es the necessary condition for optimality is k2.
4.2 Subsidies to Capital
In this section we analyze examples in which, at the constrained steady state
satisfying …rst-order conditions, capital is subsidized at the optimal, constrained,
tax plan. We use a speci…c value of deviation associated with irredeemable loss
of reputation: once a government deviates, agents expect capital to be taxed at
maximal rates at all future periods and therefore do not save. This is an extreme
“punishment”, and therefore the most likely to deter deviation. Milder forms,
where the loss of reputation and con…dence is temporary, or where expectations
switch to higher rather than maximal tax rates, can also be analyzed along the
lines of the example below.
We begin with a special example with linear utility, where:





and the production function is
f(k;L) = A(²)k + BL + ²k
®L
1¡®: (4.38)
Later we consider a more general form, with non-linear utility, as in equation
4.39. Those examples should make clear that the capital subsidy results do not
depend on the linearity of the utility function.
Here A(²) =
1
¯ ¡ '(²), where ' is a continuous strictly increasing function,
with '(0) = 0. The production function therefore is a weighted average of a
component linear in capital and a standard Cobb-Douglas production function.
This speci…cation will be useful to construct parametric examples in Section 4.2.
It will be clear from the discussion that follows that the essential feature of the
example is not the Cobb-Douglas form, but the fact that the marginal product of
capital goes to in…nity as the capital stock goes to zero.
17The two functions W (k) and V D (k) are de…ned as in the previous section. In
particular the value of defection V D has two components: the value from the …rst
period, which depends on k, and the value from the following periods, which is
a constant independent of k . We denote by LD (k) and LW (k) respectively the
optimal labor choices for deviation and for the value of W. Note that W (0) =
V D (0) and that LW (0) = LD (0): The following lemma establishes that for ² > 0;
the slope of W (k) becomes larger than the slope of V D (k) as k ! 0: Note also
from the lemma that there is a discontinuity at ² = 0:
Lemma 5 1. As k tends to zero, the di¤erence between the derivative of W term
and the V D term becomes, for ¯ > ®; in…nitely large and positive for any ² > 0:
More formally: for any …xed ² > 0 and ¯ > ®, and any number M, there is a value
k(²;M) such that for all values of k less than that, the di¤erence is larger than M.
2. For ² = 0, the di¤erence between the derivative of W and V D tends, as k
tends to zero, to a strictly negative value.
The proof of this lemma is relegated to the appendix. The lemma establishes
that when ² > 0 and ¯ > ® we have limk!0[((1¡¯)¡1Wk(k)¡V D
k (k)] > 0, that is
the slope of (1 ¡ ¯)¡1W is strictly larger than the slope of V D at k = 0. However
if ¯ < 1, then the function (1 ¡ ¯)¡1W may again intersect the function V D at
positive values of k; so for values of k where (1 ¡ ¯)¡1W (k) < V D (k), k cannot
be sustained as a steady state. A time-inconsistency problem arises if the optimal
Chamley-Judd steady state for kg falls within such a region; and the best incentive
compatible steady state cannot lie in this region. Consider for example a situation
as depicted in Figure 2 below, where (1 ¡ ¯)
¡1W (k) < V D (k) for k 2 (k1;k2), and
kg 2 (k1;k2). The next proposition, that follows directly from lemma 4 establishes
that both k1 and k2 are viable candidates for the optimal steady state.
Proposition 6 For both k = k1 and k = k2, we have 1 + a 2 (0;¯
¡1).
In the following section we present some calibrated examples to illustrate how
the best sustainable steady states may have capital taxes or capital subsidies.
Some Numerical Examples
To get a better sense of the e¤ects of incentive constraints on the tax rates and of
how these e¤ects vary with parameters, we resort to computations for a parame-
trized family of examples. We also modify the utility function (see equation 4.37)
to allow the inverse labor supply elasticity, e, to become a parameter:









We initially set ¾ = 0; so that the utility of consumption is linear. To de…ne
the production function we set A(²) = ¯
¡1¡z²r; where z = 1; r = 7=8; B = 3 and
18® = 0:34: We set the discount factor at ¯ = 0:95 and the government expenditures
at G = 2: A higher ² or a higher z both increase the relative weight of the non-linear
(Cobb-Douglas) part of the production function relative to its linear part.
In a number of cases it turns out there are 4 potential constrained steady states,
that is intersections of W(k)=(1¡¯) and V D(k); at k = 0;k1;k2;k3: W(k)=(1¡¯)¡
V D(k) is positive on (0;k1), negative on (k1;k2), positive on (k2;k3) and negative
again for k > k3 (see Figure 2). In other cases, as the function V (k) shifts down
for certain parametrizations, the only constrained steady states are at k1 and k2: 9
Table 1 and Figure 2 below illustrate how the constrained taxes di¤er from
the taxes under commitment for various values of the inverse labor elasticity e;
and for the parameter ² which is a measure of the curvature of the production
function (see equation 4.38). In general capital is taxed at the steady state k1
while it is subsidized at steady state k2: The tax (subsidy) rates at candidate
steady states k1 and k2 are quite close to 0; to some extent due to the linear utility
of consumption and the almost linearity of the production function. As expected
however these speci…cations also generate substantial di¤erences in the steady state
capital stocks at k1;k2 and kg: We note that as the curvature of the production
function is increased from ² = 0:00001 to ² = 0:0025 for a given value of e;the
subsidy rate at k2 increases while the tax rate at k1 generally declines: it seems
that when the incentive constraints bind and kg cannot be sustained in the limit,
more curvature in the production function favors lower taxes (or higher subsidies)
to capital. In terms of Figure 2 this corresponds to a relative shift in both V (k)
and V D(k) so that both k1 and k2 increase. On the other hand as labor becomes
more inelastic, that is as e is increased for a …xed ², k1 declines while k2 increases
(see Table 1 ). The same is true for the ratios k1
L(k1) and k2
L(k2) which determine
the marginal products of capital: the former declines while the latter increases. In
terms of Figure 2 this re‡ects a relative downward shift in the function V (k): We
also observe from Table 1 that as labor supply becomes more inelastic, the capital
subsidies at k2 increase: the labor taxes needed to …nance a capital subsidy are
less distortionary when the labor supply is more inelastic. However, since k1 and
k1
L(k1) decline with e;while the marginal product of capital at kg is always …xed at
¯
¡1, capital taxes at k1 must go up as labor supply becomes more inelastic.
Inspecting Table 1 below, two further observations emerge. First for fe =
0:5; ² = 0:0025g and for fe = 0:45; ² = 0:002 or ² = 0:0025g we have kg < k1 : this
means that there would be capital subsidies at all of the positive candidate steady
states k1; k2 and k3: However in these cases it is clear that V (k) > V D (k) at kg; so
that kg is unconstrained and can be sustained. Second, in Figure 2, the candidate
steady state k3 is apparent. But for ² = 0:0025, when e goes from 1 to 1:15; the
di¤erence W(k)=(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ V (k)D shifts down, so that k2 and k3 get close, merge
and disappear, as also indicated in the Table 1. Then Lemma 3 implies that the
steady state solution must be k1, even though kg > k1. In fact lemma 3 indicates
9Note that unless A(²) is larger than 1 ¡ ¯;V (k) eventually slopes down as the marginal
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Figure 2: Multiple Steady States
that when k1 < kg < k2, then either k1 or k2 satis…es the necessary conditions, but
in this case there is no k2:
e ² kg k1 k2 L(kg) L(k1) L(k2) TAX(k1) TAX(k2)
1.15 .00001 .0001 .00001 6.05 1.6678 1.6678 1.6676 .00991 -.00005
1.15 .001 .0087 .0087 10.1 1.6683 1.6681 1.6428 .00839 -.00215
1.15 .002 .1000 .0236 24.4 1.6688 1.6686 1.5228 .00669 -.00401
1.15 .0025 .1043 .0324 — 1.6689 1.6689 — .00592 —
1.00 .00001 .0046 .0002 5.7 2.0000 2.0000 1.9995 .00817 -.00004
1.00 .001 .1053 .0128 8.5 2.0005 2.0003 1.9827 .00704 -.00212
1.00 .002 .1199 .0340 13.2 2.0011 2.0009 1.9471 .00549 -.00393
1.00 .0025 .1250 .0464 17.7 2.0013 2.0012 1.9077 .00474 -.00482
.500 .00001 .1665 .00024 4.6 7.4641 7.4641 7.4640 .00317 -.00003
.500 .001 .3933 .1736 5.3 7.4658 7.4657 7.4586 .00164 -.00186
.500 .002 .4477 .4428 6.3 7.4677 7.4677 7.4519 .00003 -.00342
.500 .0025 .4668 .5933 6.9 7.4687 7.4686 7.4474 -.00074 -.00417
.450 .00001 .2129 .00039 4.3 9.8283 9.8283 9.8382 .00271 -.00003
.450 .001 .5179 .3028 5.0 9.8307 9.8306 9.8245 .00095 -.00175
.450 .002 .5895 .7902 5.6 9.8333 9.8332 9.8207 -.0006 -.00321
.450 .0025 .6147 1.073 5.9 9.8346 9.8342 9.8181 -.0015 -.00390
TABLE 1
20In all the cases discussed above where kg 2 (k1;k2); both k1 and k2 are potential
steady state candidates: the condition given by lemma 1, that (1+a) 2 (0;¯
¡1); is
satis…ed at both of them. The question arises therefore as to which of the steady
states, given some initial conditions, is the optimal one, and whether a steady state
with a capital subsidy can ever be optimal. It is possible to construct examples to
show that a subsidized steady state can indeed be optimal. Consider for example
a case for which the unconstrained (Chamley-Judd) steady state kg is below, but
arbitrarily close to the constrained steady state k2. Consider the optimal path
under commitment startingclose tokg; say at k2; and which converges tokg : clearly
it dominates other feasible paths. Yet its value will now be arbitrarily close to a
path which stays at k2 with a subsidy, and which satis…es the incentive constraints.
This means that the constrained path at k2 will also dominate other feasible paths
converging to k1: Below we construct an example illustrating this possibility. We
set the parameters as follows: ® = 0:34;¯ = 0:95;B = 3;G = 2;r = 7=8, ² = 0:005,
¾ = 0:2 and e = 0:5 . We let the parameter z in the de…nition of A(²) vary. Note
that in this case the utility of consumption is strictly concave, since ¾ > 0: Table
2 illustrates how as we vary z the optimal steady state under commitment, kg,
approaches k2 from below and crosses it.
z kg k1 k2 L(kg) L(k1) L(k2) TAX(k1) TAX(k2)
0.5000 0.497 .1573 16.28 2.433 2.436 2.1500 .00522 -.00419
0.1023 5.382 .2042 5.391 2.3793 2.4371 2.3792 .00729 -.000001
0.1000 5.565 .2046 5.366 2.3772 2.4317 2.3796 .00730 .000023
TABLE 2
As shown in Table 2, for z = 0:1023; kg and k2 are very close. As we decrease
z towards 0:1, kg crosses k2: Therefore a feasible path which starts at k2 and stays
there with a subsidy generates a value that is arbitrarily close to the value of an
optimal path under commitment. Note also that at z = 0:1; although there seems
to be a positive tax at both k1 and k2; the commitment steady state kg exceeds k2;
so that in fact kg can be sustained because V (kg) > V D(kg):
We can also explore the response of the constrained steady statesto changesin ¾
which measures the curvature of the utility of consumption. Increasing ¾ increases
k2 and decreases k1, which is equivalent to a downward shift of the function V (k)
relative to V D(k), which results in an increase in taxes at k1 and an increase in
subsidies at k2. Further increases in ¾ eventually result in the disappearance of k2
as it merges with k3; and k1 remains as the only positive constrained steady state.
An analogous situation obtains for increases in z.
4.3 Capital as Commitment Device
Let us summarize the analysis of this simple model presented above. The commit-
ment steady state kg may not be sustainable and fall in between two sustainable
steady states: one steady state is higher than the commitment steady state kg,
21with negative taxes (subsidies) on capital; the second is lower, with positive taxes
on capital.
The level kg cannot be maintained because the promise of long run zero tax on
capital is not credible; and this in turn happens because the temptation to revert
to positive taxes is too strong. On the other hand, the promise, at the high steady
state, of long-run negative taxes is credible. This may sound paradoxical. The
reason for this is simply that capital subsidies give the appropriate incentive to
accumulate a higher level of capital. As capital increases beyond kg both the value
of W and the value of V D increase; they do, however, at di¤erent rates, so that
eventually
W
(1¡¯) is above V D. Note that at this higher capital stock the marginal
product of labor tends to increase, and furthermore labor supply is lower, due the
positive wealth e¤ect, than it would be at kg under commitment. (See lemma 1.)
The one time advantage of taxing the existing capital stock at a higher rate in
order to avoid the distortionary labor taxes is no longer worthwhile. So subsidies
to capital become credible in the long run because they create a level of capital
high enough to work as an endogenous commitment device against defection.
5 Appendix
5.1 The initial period
The …rst order conditions for the government’s problem in the initial period are
given by:
u
00(c0)f¸0 + ¹0w0g + u
0(c0) + ´0 = 0 (5.40)




»0(k0 + b0) + ·0 = 0 (5.42)
¹0u
0(c0) + »0L0 = 0 (5.43)
(»0 + ´0)(w0 ¡ fL(k0;L0)) ¡ ¹0v
00(L0) ¡ (´0 + u
0(c0))w0 = 0 (5.44)
w0u
0(c0) ¡ v
0(L0) = 0 (5.45)
u
0(c0) ¡ ¯r1u
0(c1) = 0 (5.46)
k1 + c0 + G¡ f(k0;L0) = 0 (5.47)
¡k1 ¡ b1 + r0(k0 + b0) + w0L0 = c0 (5.48)
22Equation (5.48) simpli…es to:
¡b1 + r0(k0 + b0)+
³
(u




L0 = f(k0;L0)¡ G (5.49)
We begin with the case without incentive constraints. First we solve for the
steady state values in conjunction with the conditions for the initial period: we
can therefore put °0
is equal to zero. Note that given b;the values of k and L are
determined from (3.23) and ( 3.24): all other steady state variables, including
steady state consumption, can be determined uniquely from these. To determine
b note from (5.46) that since ¯r = 1; we also have c0 = c1 ´ c: there is complete
consumption smoothing due to the presence of bonds that yielding a constant
return r from the initial period onwards. Now consider the transition to the steady
state in one step: that is let the variables attain their steady state value in period
one. We must check of course that this is consistent with a smoothed consumption
level that is positive. If we put r0 to its minimum value, which may be zero or rmin;
then the equations (5.45), (5.47) and (5.49), together with steady state equations
(3.21), (3.24) and (3.25), determine fw0;L0;b;k;L;cg; where the unsubscripted
variables represent the steady state values. Uniqueness of course is not assured.
Note that putting r0 to its minimum requires ·0 to be non-zero, which from (5.42)
requires »0 to be non-zero and also from (3.15) requires »i to be non-zero for all
i. If »0 is zero however, it implies that r0 is interior, and that enough revenues to
…nance all future government expenditures can be generated without taxing initial
capital at the maximum rate. It also implies that future labor taxes must be zero.10
In the case where government bonds are not allowed, »0 = 0 does not imply that
»t = 0 because equation (3.15), the …rst order condition with respect to bonds, is
no longer applicable. In this case, while tax revenues from capital are su¢cient
to meet G in the initial period, in future periods labor taxes can still be positive
because the government cannot rely on interest from selling bonds to the public.
To avoid distorting incentives for saving, the government must tax labor to meet
its expenditures on G after the initial period.
Solving for steady state values when incentive constraints are binding exactly
parallels the procedure above, except that Chamley-Judd condition given by equa-
tion (3.24) is replaced by the equation (3.23), which speci…es that the incentive
constraints binding.
10This can be seen, when constraints are not binding and °0
is are zero, from the following: In
equation 5.53 we can substuitute for ´t from equation 5.52 and solve for »t as:
»t =
¡u0(ct)(fL(kt;Lt) ¡ wt)
¡(fL(kt;Lt) ¡wt) + (¾Lwt + ¾cfL(kt;;Lt))
Clearly »t = 0 implies that fL(kt;Lt) ¡wt = 0 or that labor taxes are zero.
235.2 The multipliers
We still have to show that the steady state levels that have been computed satisfy
the all necessary conditions associated with the multipliers, and that the multipliers
are of the correct signs. Where multiple steady state solutions are found, only some
may satisfy all these necessary conditions. We now turn therefore to solving for
the values of the Lagrange multipliers on the optimal trajectory. The analysis that
follows will also provide a proof of lemma 1. We start without making steady state
assumptions.
We begin by solving for ¹t and ¸t¡1 from equations (2.10) and (2.11) and we
substitute into f¸t ¡ ¸t¡1rt + ¹twtg: We obtain, also using equation (2.3 ):
(¸t ¡ ¸t¡1rt + ¹twt) =
»t+1
u0(ct+1)
(kt+1 + bt+1) ¡
»t
u0(ct)
(rt(kt + bt) + wtLt) (5.50)




















We now can write, using (5.50) and (5.51), the equation (2.8) as:
¾c»t + u










¡t (° ¤ ¯)t u
0(ct)
(5.52)
Solving (5.52) for u0(ct) + ´t and using (2.1) and (2.11), we can write (2.12) as

















¡t (° ¤ ¯)t u
0(ct)wt
= ¯
¡t (° ¤ ¯)t v
0(Lt)
or:


































24We can now simplify equation (5.55) and solve it for »t at steady state values.
For this purpose we must evaluate ¡´t + ´t¡1 in a steady state. We can solve
equation (5.52) for ´t; take …rst di¤erences and using equation (2.9), and the fact
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; which we will take to be
equal to a constant, say (1 + a): We will demonstrate this to be the case below.




¡t (° ¤ ¯)t
´
u
0(c)(w ¡ fL(k;L)) (5.60)
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AfL(k;L) + »t¾Lw = 0




¡t (° ¤ ¯)t
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((1 + ¾L)w ¡ (1 ¡ ¾c)fL(k;L))
(5.62)





















((1 + ¾L)w ¡ (1 ¡ ¾c)fL(k;L))
(5.65)
and E is as de…ned previously. Now since
³
1 + ¯
¡t (° ¤ ¯)t
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E ¡ D ¡ F
¶
=
µ E ¡ F




µ E ¡ F
E ¡ D ¡ F
¶t
°0




; appearing in the de…nition of E which was used in the derivation of °t¯
¡t











; which is indeed constant at a steady state.
26At a steady state, therefore, it is clear that E will be constant. It follows that
»t will have the same sign as °t¯
¡t: It also follows that °t¯
¡t must be of constant





¸ 0: Furthermore we must have °t¯
¡t bounded

















¡t above to be bounded and summable, we have shown that we must have
1 + a 2 (0;¯
¡1): This proves Proposition 1 used in the text.
In particular for the case of a utility function that is linear in consumption
(¾ = 0), on which the results of section 4 are based, the expression for 1 + a can
be further simpli…ed. In such cases 1 + a ´
E¡F
E¡F¡D can be written as :
1 + a =
((1 + ¾L)w ¡ fL (kt;Lt))
((1 + ¾L)w ¡ fL (kt;Lt)) + ¾Lw
³
¯
¡1 ¡ fK (kt;Lt)
´³
V D




In section 4, where we focus on the case of utility linear in consumption, we
use the above expression for 1 + a to characterize the optimal steady states.
Proof of Lemma 5:
Proof of 1. Denote LD and LW respectively the equilibrium value of labor for
deviation and for the value W. LD is determined as follows: from the government
budget constraint, setting r = 0, combining the two derivatives to get back the
production function, and using the fact that w = L, we get:
G = f(k;L) ¡ L
2:
For LW: from the government budget constraint, setting the taxes on capital
to zero,




When k = 0 the two values of labor are the same, denoted by
L(0) = 1=2[B + (B
2 ¡ 4G)
(1=2)]











B + ²(1 ¡ ®)2(k=L)® ¡ 2L
:
The values for the two programs are:
V
D(k) = f(k;L









¡1W(k) = (1 ¡ ¯)
¡1[f(k;L
W) ¡ k ¡ G¡ 1=2(L
W(k))
2]:
So if we now compute the limit of the di¤erence between the slopes the two quan-














We have used the fact that the ratio
LW
LD tends to 1 as k tends to zero. Also
as discussed later we have ignored the A term in the numerator of the expression
for LD: this is correct when ² is non-zero, because the other terms (which become
in…nite) dominate. When ¯ > ®, given the solution of L(0) given above, the
quantity limk!0(Wk ¡ V D
k )(k) is clearly positive, and tends to in…nity as k tends
to zero. This concludes the proof of the …rst point.









The intuition is again clear: the term A which is added to the increase in labor
supply in the V D case is dominated when ² is non zero by the other gains, which
are all multiplied by ². When however ² is zero this is the only term, because
the relative gain for consumption becomes zero in the limit (since the linear terms
cancel on both sides), LW
k becomes zero, while LD stays positive and makes V D
better. This concludes the proof.
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